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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
ROBERT C. DAVIS, : 
Plaintiff-Appellant, : 
v. s Case No* 920254-CA 
Priority 16 
DAVID E. ROBINSON, et al., : 
Defendants-Appellees : 
BRIEF OF APPELLEES 
STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
Jurisdiction over this appeal is conferred upon the Utah 
Supreme Court by Utah Code Ann. § 78-2-2(3)(j) (Supp. 1992), 
providing for appellate jurisdiction over "orders, judgments, and 
decrees of any court of record over which the Court of Appeals does 
not have original jurisdiction." Accordingly, the defendants-
appellees have filed a motion to transfer this appeal to the Utah 
Supreme Court in accordance with U. R. App. P. 44. 
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES 
1. Whether a direct appeal from an agency order to an 
appellate court is the exclusive means of judicial review of 
Davis's constitutional challenge to a pending formal adjudicative 
proceeding against him in the Division of Occupational & 
Professional Licensing? 
Standard of Review: This is a question of statutory 
interpretation, a question of law that should be reviewed for 
correctness. Ward v. Richfield Citv, 798 P.2d 757, 759 (Utah 1990). 
1 
2. Whether a collateral attack on a pending formal 
adjudicative proceeding of a state agency should be barred for 
failure to exhaust administrative remedies? 
Standard of Review: Absent a statutory provision 
requiring or waiving exhaustion, a decision to require exhaustion 
of administrative remedies is reviewed for an abuse of discretion. 
Hoeft v. Tucson Unified School Diet., 967 F.2d 1298, 1302-03 (9th 
Cir. 1992); Panola Land Buyers Ass'n v. Shuman, 762 F.2d 1550, 
1556-57 (11th Cir. 1985). 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Nature of the Case 
This is an appeal from a final judgment dated March 23, 
1992 of the Third Judicial District Court, Salt Lake County, Utah, 
the Honorable Frank G. Noel presiding, dismissing an action by a 
licensed medical doctor against the Division of Occupational and 
Professional Licensing (the Division or DOPL). Plaintiff sought to 
enjoin pending disciplinary proceedings against him on the ground 
that they were unconstitutional. The district court ruled that the 
proper procedure for such a challenge was by direct appeal from the 
administrative proceedings to an appellate court. 
Course of the Proceedings and Disposition Below 
Plaintiff filed his complaint on November 22, 1991. In 
December 1991, the Division filed a motion to dismiss. After oral 
argument, the Court issued a memorandum decision granting the 
Division's motion. An order dismissing the complaint with 
prejudice was signed and entered on March 23, 1992. The notice of 
2 
appeal was filed on April 20, 1992. 
Statement of Facts 
In December 1989, the Division of Occupational and 
Professional Licensing initiated formal proceedings against Robert 
C. Davis, a medical doctor licensed in Utah, to sanction Davis for 
alleged violations of the Medical Practice Act, Utah Code Ann. §§ 
58-12-26 to -43, including fraudulent billing, rendering 
unnecessary medical treatment and tests, making false diagnoses, 
inappropriate sexual conduct with patients and staff, and 
overprescribing drugs. R. 3, 35-99. Davis had previously been 
placed on probation by the Division until July 1992 and the 
Division also alleged he had violated the terms of his probation. 
R. 5, 36-37. Thereafter, Davis filed this action in the district 
court seeking to enjoin the disciplinary proceedings on the ground 
that the proceedings violated his due process rights under the 
fifth and fourteen amendments to the United States Constitution and 
article 1, section 7 of the Utah Constitution for three reasons: 
(1) the Director of the Division was allegedly biased against 
Davis, (2) the Director was statutorily vested with investigative, 
prosecutorial and adjudicative powers, and (3) the Division had 
instituted the proceedings without prior notice to Davis that it 
considered him in violation of the terms of his probation. R. 2-
10. 
In response to Davis's complaint, the Division filed a 
motion to dismiss on the ground, inter alia, that Davis had failed 
to exhaust his administrative remedies. R. 24-34. After full 
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briefing and oral argument, the district court granted the 
Division's motion, holding that Davis should raise his 
constitutional challenges on direct appeal from the Division 
proceedings as provided by the Utah Administrative Procedures Act, 
SS 63-64b-l to -22 (1989)-1 R. 136-38, 141-42. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
Davis's declaratory judgment action in the district court 
challenging the constitutionality of the Division's disciplinary 
proceedings against him was precluded by the Utah Administrative 
Procedures Act which governs judicial review of all agency 
xIn section A of his statement of facts, and at various points 
throughout his brief, including addenda D, E, F and G, Davis refers 
to his federal court action to enjoin the administrative 
proceedings. These are improper references to matters outside the 
record and should be stricken or disregarded under Rule 24(k) of 
the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure. Moreover, Davis's 
unsuccessful federal court action is immaterial to any of the 
issues properly before the court, Davis's persistent efforts to 
derail the pending administrative proceedings do not enhance the 
merits of his legal arguments. 
Similarly, in section B of his statement of facts and at 
various points throughout his brief, including addenda H, I, and J, 
Davis refers to his motion to dismiss filed in the Division 
proceedings and the administrative law judge's ruling denying that 
motion. Those matters are also both irrelevant and outside the 
record on appeal. Therefore, they should also be stricken or 
disregarded under U. R. App. P. Rule 24(k). If the Court does 
consider them, however, it should note that Davis's 
characterization of the ALJ's ruling is inaccurate and misleading. 
Judge Eklund did not suggest that Davis file a collateral action in 
state district court to enjoin the administrative proceedings. 
Rather, Judge Eklund merely responded to the request of Davis's 
counsel for a stay of the administrative proceedings in order to 
file such an action: "But it seems to me, in requesting me to stay 
this proceeding, it would have been more appropriate to have 
already filed that action and have taken the steps to pursue that 
remedy before you ask me to stay this proceeding now." Davis 
Brief, Addendum I at 2. Thus, the suggestion that an action should 
be filed in state district court was that of Davis's own counsel, 
not the ALJ. 
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adjudicative proceedings, unless otherwise expressly provided by 
statute. Thus, the district court properly dismissed Davis's 
complaint as a matter of law* 
Even if the district court had discretion to review 
Davis's claim, it properly exercised that discretion here to 
require Davis to exhaust his administrative remedies. The 
statutory scheme for judicial review of agency orders provides an 
adequate means of reviewing Davis's constitutional claims. Davis 
will not suffer any substantial irreparable harm from being 
required to raise those claims on direct appeal from an agency 
order and the public interest in going forward with the 
disciplinary proceedings far outweighs any harm caused to Davis by 
requiring exhaustion* 
The district court properly dismissed Davis's complaint 
and the judgment should therefore be affirmed. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
UAPA PROVIDES THE EXCLUSIVE MEANS 
FOR JUDICIAL REVIEW OF DOPL'S ACTION 
AGAINST DAVIS'S LICENSE TO PRACTICE 
MEDICINE 
Davis brought his complaint against the Division under 
the Declaratory Judgments Act, Utah Code Ann. §§ 78-33-1 to -13 
(1992), which grants the district courts jurisdiction to "declare 
rights, status, and other legal relations, whether or not further 
relief is or could be claimed." R. 2. The Declaratory Judgments 
Act, however, must be read with the Utah Administrative Procedures 
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Act, Utah Code Ann. §§ 63-46b-l to -22 (1989 & Supp. 1991) 
("UAPA")2, which provides: 
Except as set forth in Subsection (2), 
and except as otherwise provided by a statute 
superseding provisions of this chapter by 
explicit reference to this chapter, the 
provisions of this chapter apply to every 
agency of the state of Utah and govern: 
(a) all state agency actions 
that determine the legal rights, 
duties, privileges, immunities, or 
other legal interests of one or more 
identifiable persons, including all 
agency actions to grant, deny, 
revoke, suspend, modify, annul, 
withdraw, or amend an authority 
right, or license; and 
(b) judicial review of all 
such actions. 
Utah Code Ann. § 63-46b-l(l) (Supp. 1991) (emphasis added). The 
Division's action against Davis's license to practice medicine does 
not fall within any of the exceptions listed in subsection (2) of 
section 1 of UAPA. See Utah Code Ann. § 63-46b-l(2) (Supp. 1991). 
Nor does the Declaratory Judgments Act make explicit reference to 
Chapter 46b. Thus, in plain and unambiguous terms, UAPA provides 
the exclusive means for judicial review of the Division's action 
against Davis's license. 
The procedure for such review is set forth in UAPA 
sections 14 and 16. Section 16, applying to formal adjudicative 
proceedings such as the Division's disciplinary proceedings against 
2Unless otherwise indicated, all citations to UAPA are to the 
version in effect in December 1991 when Davis filed his complaint 
herein. Various provisions have since been amended, see Utah Code 
Ann. §§ 63-46b-0.5, -1, -15, -22 (Supp. 1992), but none of the 
amendments affect UAPA's application in this case. 
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Davis, states that ,f[a]s provided by statute, the Supreme Court or 
the Court of Appeals has jurisdiction to review all final agency 
action resulting from formal adjudicative proceedings•M While 
section 16 itself is not a grant of jurisdiction, Utah Code Ann, § 
78-2a-3(2)(a) (1992) confers jurisdiction on the Court of Appeals 
over 
the final orders and decrees resulting from 
formal adjudicative proceedings of state 
agencies . . • , except the Public Service 
Commission, State Tax Commission, Board of 
State Lands, Board of Oil, Gas and Mining, and 
the state engineer. 
And, jurisdiction over "formal adjudicative proceedings originating 
with" the agencies not within the jurisdiction of the Court of 
Appeals is conferred on the Supreme Court under Utah Code Ann. § 
78-2-2(3)(e) (1992). 
In granting the Supreme Court or the Court of Appeals 
exclusive jurisdiction to review formal adjudicative proceedings of 
administrative agencies, the legislature expressly contemplated 
constitutional challenges such as those Davis attempted to raise in 
this case. Section 63-46b-16(4) provides: 
The appellate court shall grant relief only 
if, on the basis of the agency's record, it 
determines that a person seeking judicial 
review has been substantially prejudiced by 
any of the following: 
(a) the agency action, or the statute or 
rule on which the agency action is based, is 
unconstitutional on its face or as applied; 
* * * 
(e) the agency has engaged in an 
unlawful procedure or decision-making process, 
or has failed to follow the prescribed 
procedure, 
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(f) the persons taking the agency action 
were illegally constituted as a decision-
making body or were subject to 
disqualification ? 
• * * 
(h) the agency action is: 
* * * 
(iv) otherwise arbitrary and 
capricious. 
(emphasis added). The above provisions encompass all three of the 
grounds on which Davis alleged the Division proceedings would 
violate his due process rights. The alleged bias of the director 
(a claim Davis concedes was mooted by the director's recusal of 
himself from the Division proceedings3) is reviewable under 
subsection 4(f). The alleged concentration of investigative, 
prosecutorial and adjudicatory powers in the Director would be 
addressed under subsection 4(a) or (e). The alleged lack of notice 
that the Division considered him in violation of the terms of his 
probation would be reviewed under 4(a), (e) or (h)(iv). 
Thus, UAPA clearly intended that challenges to agency 
proceedings such as that Davis attempted to make in the district 
court be brought only by appeal from a final agency order to the 
Supreme Court or the Court of Appeals. The district court properly 
dismissed Davis's complaint. 
Davis's contention that this case meets the requirements 
for waiver of the exhaustion requirement under UAPA section 14(2) 
is unavailing. First, whether or not section 14(2) requires Davis 
exhaust all administrative remedies available to him, under the 
provisions of UAPA discussed above, a direct appeal from the agency 
3R. 105. 
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proceedings to the appropriate appellate court remains the only 
means for obtaining judicial review of formal adjudicative 
proceedings of a state agency. UAPA restricts the reach of the 
Declaratory Judgments Act whether or not there exists an additional 
requirement of exhausting administrative remedies. Thus, whether, 
once a final order has been issued by the agency, further 
administrative proceedings must be completed before Davis may 
obtain judicial review, is irrelevant here. Compare Hi-Countrv 
Homeowners Ass'n v. Public Service Comm'n, 779 P.2d 682 passim 
(Utah 1989) (dismissing petition for review of final order of PSC 
for lack of jurisdiction where petitioner failed to seek rehearing 
in PSC) with Heinecke v. Dep't of Commerce, 810 P.2d 459, 462-64 
(Utah Ct. App. 1991) (appeal of DOPL order to Executive Director of 
Department of Commerce not a prerequisite to review by Court of 
Appeals). Indeed, in arguing that UAPA section 14 does not require 
exhaustion, Davis effectively concedes that UAPA controls his 
claims. 
To the extent interlocutory judicial review of agency 
proceedings is permitted under UAPA/ the proper forum for such 
review would still be in the Supreme Court or Court of Appeals, not 
the district court. Indeed, in a related case, Davis has 
AThe appellate courts have jurisdiction over interlocutory 
appeals from agency adjudicative proceedings under Utah Code Ann. 
SS 78-2a-3(2)(a) (1992) and 78-2-2(3)(e) (1992). Such appeals are 
granted only as a matter of discretion under Rule 5 of the Utah 
Rules of Appellate Procedure, where the order sought to be reviewed 
"involves substantial rights and may materially affect the final 
decision or that a determination of the correctness of the order 
before final judgment will better serve the interests of justice. 
U. R. App. P. 5(e). 
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petitioned the Court of Appeals for review of the Division's denial 
of his motion to certify as final its order denying his motion to 
dismiss* See Davis v. Div. of Occupational and Professional 
Licensing, No. 920482-CA. Ironically, choosing instead to pursue 
this appeal, Davis has not sought interlocutory review of the 
Division's order denying his motion to dismiss, which was made on 
the same grounds Davis seeks to raise in this action. 
While UAPA does not grant authority to certify an order 
as final for purposes of review, it does contemplate a stay of the 
administrative proceedings during the pendency of judicial review. 
Utah Code Ann. § 63-46b-18(l) (1989). Where the agency denies a 
motion for such a stay, the court may grant the stay upon finding 
either that the agency has violated its own rules in denying the 
stay or that the following four criteria are met: 
(i) the party seeking judicial review is 
likely to prevail on the merits when the court 
finally disposes of the matter; 
(ii) the party seeking judicial review 
will suffer irreparable injury without 
immediate relief; 
(iii) granting relief to the party 
seeking review will not substantially harm 
other parties to the proceedings; and 
(iv) the threat to the public health, 
safety, or welfare relief upon by the agency 
is not sufficiently serious to justify the 
agency's action under the circumstances. 
Utah Code Ann. § 63-46b-18(4)(b) (1989). Davis's suggestion that 
the above requirements may be avoided simply by proceeding in 
district court under the Declaratory Judgment Act and seeking 
injunctive relief is untenable. Even the Supreme Court and the 
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Court of Appeals are required to comply with the requirements of 
UAPA in reviewing agency adjudicative proceedings. See Utah Code 
Ann. §§ 78-2-2(6) (1992) and 78-2a-3(4) (1992). 
As the Court of Appeals has acknowledged, UAPA intended 
to divest the district courts of their prior role as intermediate 
appellate courts except in informal adjudicative proceedings. See 
In re Tooik, 761 P.2d 32, 33 n.3 (Utah Ct. App- 1988), cert. 
denied, 773 P.2d 45 (Utah 1989). Davis's attempt to resolve issues 
relating to formal adjudicative proceedings of the Division by 
collateral attack in the district courts would frustrate that 
intent. 
To support his declaratory judgment action, Davis cites 
to several Utah cases in which claims against administrative 
agencies were addressed by an action for declaratory relief. None 
of those cases are apposite here. In Utah Restaurant Ass'n v. 
Davis County Bd. of Health, 709 P.2d 1159, 1160-61 (Utah 1985), the 
Supreme Court held that the statutory scheme for judicial review 
did not apply since the agency action at issue was a rulemaking, 
rather than an adjudicative proceeding. Clayton v. Bennett, 5 Utah 
2d 152, 298 P.2d 531 (1956), was a pre-UAPA case and did not 
involve adjudicatory proceedings or a statutorily-prescribed means 
of judicial review. Similarly, Phi Kappa Iota Fraternity v. Salt 
Lake City, 116 Utah 536, 212 P.2d 177 (1949) and Backman v. Salt 
Lake County, 13 Utah 2d 412, 375 P.2d 756 (1962), were both pre-
UAPA cases, did not involve adjudicatory proceedings or other 
proceedings for which there was a specific statutory scheme for 
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judicial review, and indeed did not even involve administrative 
agencies of the state. Moreover, neither Phi Kappa Iota nor 
Backman even addressed the issue of whether relief was properly 
sought in the district court by action for declaratory relief. 
Contrary to the implication Davis attempts to draw from 
the above cases, the Utah Supreme Court has acknowledged that 
"[w]here an appeal from an action of an administrative body is 
provided by statute, a remedy by way of declaratory judgment will 
be denied. The proper procedure to challenge the statute and the 
administration thereof is by judicial review after final 
administrative action has been taken." Baird v. State, 574 P. 2d 
713, 718 (Utah 1978). 
Hciving granted the statutory right to obtain declaratory 
relief, it was within the prerogative of the legislature to 
restrict that right in the context of administrative proceedings. 
Construing section 63-46b-l(l) according to its plain meaning, UAPA 
provides the exclusive means of judicial review of formal 
adjudicatory proceedings of the Division by appeal from a final 
order to the Supreme Court or Court of Appeals. For that reason, 
the district court properly dismissed Davis's complaint. 
POINT II 
EVEN IF UAPA WERE NOT THE EXCLUSIVE 
REMEDY, THE DISTRICT COURT DID NOT 
ABUSE ITS DISCRETION IN REQUIRING 
DAVIS TO EXHAUST HIS ADMINISTRATIVE 
REMEDIES 
The district court also properly dismissed Davis's 
complaint under the doctrine of exhaustion of administrative 
12 
remedies. As Davis correctly points out in his brief, whether a 
party should be required to exhaust administrative remedies is a 
purely discretionary decision. Davis Brief at 14-15. Under the 
circumstances of this case, where a formal adjudicative proceeding 
was (and still is) pending against Davis, the district court 
properly exercised that discretion not to interfere with those 
proceedings. 
The burden is on the party seeking collateral review of 
an administrative proceeding to establish a basis for waiving the 
exhaustion requirement. Honio v. Doe, 484 U.S. 305, 327 (1988); 
Koerpel v. Heckler, 797 F.2d 858, 863 (10th Cir. 1986); Park 'N Flv 
of San Francisco, Inc. v. City of So. San Francisco, 188 Cal. App. 
3d 1201, 234 Cal. Rptr. 23, 27 (Cal. Ct. App. 1987). Here, Davis 
has failed to sustain his burden of demonstrating a basis for 
excusing him from the exhaustion requirement. 
A. Davis's Administrative Remedies Include 
Judicial Review of His Constitutional Claims 
and Are Therefore Adequate 
Davis first contends that the exhaustion requirement 
should be waived because the Division lacks jurisdiction to decide 
the constitutional questions raised in his district court complaint 
and therefore his administrative remedies are inadequate. As the 
Utah Supreme Court held in Johnson v. Utah State Retirement Office, 
621 P.2d 1234 (Utah 1980), however, 
the mere introduction of a constitutional 
issue does not obviate the need for exhaustion 
of administrative remedies. As stated in 
Public Utilities, "if . • .an administrative 
proceeding might leave no remnant of the 
constitutional question, the administrative 
13 
remedy plainly should be pursued." 
621 P.2d at 1237 (Utah 1980), citing Public Utilities Comm'n v. 
United States, 355 U.S. 534, 539-40 (1958), rehearing denied, 356 
U.S. 925 (1958). 
Davis attempts to distinguish Johnson on the ground that 
the plaintiffs there were seeking recovery of retirement 
contributions made by their employer and "were not facing an 
unconstitutional deprivation of property without due process of 
law, as is Davis." Davis Brief at 13. This assertion assumes too 
much. In claiming that "only constitutional issues have been 
raised" here, Davis Brief at 14, Davis fails to recognize that the 
Division proceedings he seeks to enjoin undoubtedly will address 
numerous other issues. Notably, Davis does not assert that he will 
not contest the charges of unprofessional conduct brought against 
him other than on the constitutional grounds he has attempted to 
raise here. Thus, a possible outcome of the Division proceedings 
is that Davis will be absolved of the charges and thus will not 
suffer a deprivation of a property interest at all. In that case, 
his constitutional issues will be mooted. 
As stated by the United States Supreme Court in Aircraft 
S Diesel Equip. Corp. v. Hirsch, 331 U.S. 752, 772 (1947), M[T]he 
very fact that constitutional issues are put forward constitutes a 
strong reason for not allowing this suit either to anticipate or 
take the place of the Tax Court's final performance of its 
function. When that has been done, it is possible that nothing 
will be left of appellant's claim . . . ." See also Public 
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Utilities Comm'n v. United States, 355 U.S. at 539-40 (M[i]f • . . 
an administrative proceeding might leave no remnant of the 
constitutional question, the administrative remedy plainly should 
be pursued"). This is consistent with the policy of exercising 
judicial restraint to avoid reaching constitutional questions, 
State v. Thurman, No. 910494, slip op. at 7 (Utah filed Jan. 7, 
1993), or disposing of matters in piecemeal fashion. Kennedy v. New 
Era Industries, Inc., 600 P.2d 534, 535-37 (Utah 1979) (discussing 
final judgment rule). 
Davis's further assertion that the Division proceedings 
"would add nothing to an adjudication of the facial validity of the 
statutes," Davis Brief at 14, is completely unsupported by any 
legal analysis. Contrary to this assertion, where a statutorily-
prescribed means of judicial review of the constitutional claims is 
provided, as in this case, a facial constitutional challenge cannot 
be used to evade the administrative process. In Gaunce v. De 
Vincentis, 708 F.2d 1290 (7th Cir. 1983), cert, denied, 464 U.S. 
978 (1983), for example, the court of appeals held that the 
district court lacked jurisdiction to review a facial 
constitutional challenge to an Federal Aviation Administration 
proceeding to revoke a pilot's Airman Certificate. In so holding, 
the court stated: 
The statutorily prescribed requirements 
cannot be dispensed with merely because the 
administrative proceeding dealt with an 
agency's proof of specified regulatory 
violations, while appellant is raising a due 
process constitutional claim in the judicial 
proceeding. So long as effective means for 
judicial review are ultimately available where 
15 
the constitutional claims can be raised, 
appellant may not dispense with the 
requirement of prior administrative review, 
otherwise judicial review would be an abstract 
process, "It is not axiomatic that 
challenging the constitutionality of a statute 
on its face as opposed to its application will 
permit a litigant to bypass the administrative 
process since under cases such as this '[t]he 
effect would be that important and difficult 
constitutional questions would be decided 
devoid of factual content.'" 
708 F.2d at 1293 (emphasis added). See also W.E.B. DuBois Clubs v. 
Clark, 389 U.S. 309 (1967), rehearing denied, 390 U.S. 319 (1968), 
(affirming dismissal of complaint challenging constitutionality of 
Subversive Activities Control Act on its face under the first 
amendment where constitutional issue could be raised on appeal from 
board to court of appeals). 
Here, not only may Davis raise his constitutional claims 
on direct appeal from the Division proceedings, there is 
considerable variation in the manner in which the challenged 
statutes may be applied. For example, the Director's recusal from 
the adjudicative proceedings in response to Davis's allegations of 
bias has not only mooted the bias claim, but in all likelihood has 
also mooted Davis's claim that the Director is granted an 
unconstitutional combination of investigative, prosecutorial and 
adjudicative powers. Thus, allowing the Division proceedings to go 
forward to completion will considerably assist appellate review by 
precisely framing the constitutional question presented.5 
Davis relies on Ward v. Village of Monroeville, 409 U.S. 
5See also discussion in Point II.B. below concerning Withrow 
v. Larkin, 421 U.S. 35 (1975). 
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57 (1972), to contend that he is entitled to an impartial 
adjudication in the first instance. Ward, however, addressed 
criminal traffic violation proceedings in which the plaintiff 
contended that the judicial officer, the mayor of the city whose 
revenues were derived from traffic fines, was biased. Here, Davis 
has conceded that his bias claim has been mooted by the Director's 
recusal. Moreover, in Ward, the administrative remedy deemed 
inadequate was not direct appellate review, but a de novo 
proceeding before an impartial judicial officer followed ultimately 
by appellate review. Under the statutory scheme in Ward., the 
constitutional adequacy of the first adjudication would never be 
reached because it was superseded by a de novo review. As noted by 
the United States Supreme Court in that case, "there is nothing to 
suggest that the incentive to convict would be diminished by the 
possibility of reversal on appeal." 409 U.S. at 61. Unlike the 
scheme in Ward, the administrative procedure here establishes 
direct appellate review of the initial adjudicative proceeding. 
Thus, any constitutional error in the initial adjudicative 
proceedings will be corrected and the agency has substantial 
incentive to protect the viability of its adjudications by avoiding 
reversible error. Davis's broad interpretation of the language in 
Ward to mandate review of constitutional claims before the initial 
adjudicative proceedings are held is incorrect and cannot be 
squared with Aircraft & Diesel Equip. Corp. v. Hirsch, 331 U.S. 752 
(1947) and W.E.B. DuBois Clubs v. Clark, 389 U.S. 309 (1967), 
rehearing denied, 390 U.S. 319 (1968). See also Gaunce v. De 
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Vincentis, 708 F.2d 1290 (7th Cir. 1983), cert, denied and appeal 
dismissed, 464 U.S. 978 (1983). 
Nor does either Parkdale Care Center v. Frandsen, 194 
Utah Adv. Rep. 28 (Utah Ct. App. August 20, 1992), or Hatton-Ward 
v. Salt Lake City, 828 P.2d 1071 (Utah Ct. App. 1992), support 
Davis's contention that he should not be required to exhaust his 
constitutional claims. In Parkdale, the Court of Appeals held only 
that the plaintiff's breach of contract and wrongful termination of 
employment claims lay completely outside the scope of Industrial 
Commission proceedings. 194 Utah Adv. Rep. at 30. Similarly, 
Hatton-Ward held that the plaintiff's claim under the Whistle-
Blower statute was outside the scope of the Civil Service 
Commission. In so holding, the Court of Appeals specifically noted 
that judicial review from Commission proceedings was restricted to 
whether the Commission exceeded its discretion and authority. 828 
P.2d at 1074. Thus, the plaintiff's Whistle Blower claims were not 
reviewable even on appeal from Commission proceedings. 
Unlike the claims in Parkdale and Hatton-Ward, Davis's 
claims arise directly from the administrative proceedings and are 
properly addressed only on direct appeal from those proceedings.6 
6Several other cases relied upon by Davis are distinguishable 
on the same basis. In Panola Land Buyers Ass'n v. Shuman, 762 F.2d 
1550 (11th Cir. 1985), the court found that the plaintiff's claims 
fell completely outside the purview of any administrative agency 
and thus were not reviewable even on direct appeal from an agency 
decision. In Lucchesi v. State, 807 P.2d 1185 (Colo. App. 1990), 
the court held that the very statutes that the plaintiff challenged 
in a declaratory judgment action expressly prohibited his use of 
the administrative procedures the defendants argued the plaintiff 
was required to exhaust. Moreover, the court did not even address 
whatever procedures, if any, were available for judicial review by 
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To permit a collateral attack on the Division proceedings would not 
simply provide relief not available through the agency as Davis 
contends, it would substantially impede the Division from 
fulfilling its legislatively-established mission. The district 
court properly dismissed Davis's complaint for failure to exhaust 
the administrative remedy of direct judicial review from a final 
agency order.7 
B. The Public Interest In Going Forward With The 
Disciplinary Process Far Outweighs The 
Potential Harm To Davis From Reguiring 
Exhaustion 
The public interest in going forward with the proceedings 
against Davis far outweighs any potential harm to Davis from 
direct appeal from the agency ruling. In Collopv v* Wildlife 
Comm'n, 625 P. 2d 994 (Colo. 1981), the court held that no 
administrative process even existed for review of the plaintiff's 
claim that wildlife regulations had caused a taking of his property 
without just compensation. 
7The other cases Davis relies upon are also inapposite for 
various reasons. Gibson v. Berrvhill, 411 U.S. 564 (1973) and 
National Advertising Co* v. Town of Babylon, 900 F.2d 551 (2d Cir. 
1990) both involved civil rights claims under 28 U.S.C. § 1983. 
The exhaustion doctrine does not even apply to § 1983 claims. See 
411 U.S. at 574. McGowan v. Marshall, 604 F.2d 885 (5th Cir. 
1979), involved a direct appeal from a final agency order, not a 
collateral attack on pending adjudicative proceedings. In Vargas 
v. United States Dep't of Immigration & Naturalization, 831 F.2d 
906 (9th Cir. 1987), the court applied the exhaustion doctrine to 
deny review of the plaintiff's constitutional claims. In Farrokhi 
v. United States Dep't of Immigration & Naturalization, 900 F.2d 
697 (4th Cir. 1990), the court specifically declined to rule on the 
exhaustion issue because the constitutional issues raised had no 
merit in any event. Significantly, in McGrath v. Weinberger, 541 
F.2d 249 (10th Cir. 1976), cert, denied, McGrath v. Califano, 430 
U.S. 933 (1977), no pending administrative proceeding was disrupted 
by collateral review. Moreover, McGrath would not permit 
collateral review of all constitutional questions, but only those 
involving the "constitutional applicability of legislation to 
particular facts." 541 F.2d at 251. 
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requiring him to exhaust his administrative remedies. 
First, substantially all of the harm Davis attributes to 
the proceedings, i.e., the adverse publicity and damage to his 
professional reputation and practice, is inherent in the 
proceedings themselves and does not flow from any alleged 
violations of his due process rights. Davis's constitutional 
claims challenge only certain aspects of the process by which the 
Division will conduct its proceedings against him, not the 
Division's basic right to bring those proceedings. As stated by 
United States Supreme Court Justice Brandeis in Myers v. Bethlehem 
Shipbuilding Corp., 303 U.S. 41, 50-52 (1938): 
the rule requiring exhaustion of 
administrative remedies cannot be circumvented 
by asserting that the charge on which the 
complaint rests is groundless and that the 
mere holding of the prescribed administrative 
hearing would result in irreparable damage. 
Lawsuits also often prove to have been 
groundless; but no way has been discovered of 
relieving a defendant from the necessity of a 
trial to establish the fact. 
Thus, Davis has no right not to have the proceedings brought and 
the charges made against him. 
Moreover, as conceded by Davis in his brief, he is 
currently subject to federal criminal proceedings arising from 
essentially the same conduct that is the subject of the Division's 
proceedings against him. Upon Davis's motion, the Division 
proceedings have been indefinitely stayed at least until the 
schedule trial date in the criminal prosecution in April 1993. R. 
193-200. If Davis is prosecuted before a hearing is held by the 
Division, as appears likely, he will already have incurred 
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substantially all of whatever adverse publicity and damage to his 
professional reputation and practice otherwise would have been 
caused by the Division proceedings. In arguing that a direct 
appeal from the Division proceedings is inadequate, Davis 
characterizes that harm as "irreparable" and "irreversible," Davis 
Brief at 12 & 13; thus, even the possibility of an acquittal in the 
federal prosecution will not undo the harm stemming from the 
prosecution itself. Davis has not explained how the Division 
proceedings will inflict any substantial harm to his reputation or 
practice not already and inevitably visited upon him by the 
criminal proceedings. 
In addition, the constitutional claims Davis attempted to 
raise below are palpably weak.8 As Davis has already conceded, the 
first of his three counts, alleging bias of the Division director, 
was mooted by the Director's recusal. R. 105. 
That recusal also moots any substantial constitutional 
question concerning the exercise of investigative, prosecutorial 
and adjudicatory powers by the director. Since the investigation 
was conducted and the resulting petition against Davis was 
initiated under the supervision of a person who will not be 
involved in the remaining proceedings, there is no significant 
merging of investigative, prosecutorial and adjudicative power. 
8Davis failed to address this consideration in his opening 
brief, implying that this Court must take his allegation of a due 
process violation as true for purposes of reviewing the district 
court's dismissal of his claims. Davis Brief at vii n.l. The 
allegation of a due process violation is not, however, a factual 
claim. Rather, it is a conclusion of law subject to challenge on 
a motion to dismiss. 
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Even if Davis's second count against the Division were 
not mooted by the director's recusal, Davis's broad, conclusory 
allegation of a facial constitutional violation would be 
insufficient to justify waiver of the exhaustion requirement. Both 
of the cases on which Davis relies actually rejected similar 
constitutional claims. See Wi throw v. Larkin, 421 U.S. 35 (1975); 
In re McCune, 717 P.2d 701 (Utah 1986). As acknowledged by the 
United States Supreme Court in Withrow v. Larkin, 421 U.S. 35, 52 
(1975), "'[tjhe case law, both federal and state, generally rejects 
the idea that the combination [of] judging [and] investigating 
functions is a denial of due process, '" citing 2 K. Davis, 
Administrative Law Treatise § 13.02, p. 175 (1958). 
Indeed, in Withrow v. Larkin, the United States Supreme 
Court effectively foreclosed a facial challenge to the combination 
of powers in an administrative agency or agency head, noting that 
the internal organization of an agency "may minimize the risks 
arising from combining investigation and adjudication," 421 U.S. at 
54 n. 20, and stating, "That the combination of investigative and 
adjudicative* functions does not, without more, constitute a due 
process violation, does not, of course, preclude a court from 
determining from the special facts and circumstances present in the 
case before it that the risk of unfairness is intolerably high." 
421 U.S. at 58 (emphasis added). See also Chemical Waste 
Management, Inc. v. United States Envtl. Protection Agency, 873 
F.2d 1477, 1484 (D.C. Cir. 1989) (relying upon Withrow in 
dismissing a facial challenge to agency's combined powers). Cf. 
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Crawford v. Tillev, 780 P.2d 1248, 1252 (Utah 1989) (statutes are 
to be construed so as to avoid constitutional defects). 
Here, it remains to be seen how the statutory grant of 
power to the Division director will be applied in the Division 
proceedings against Davis* Although, as agency head, the director 
wields supervisory authority over the Division's investigative, 
prosecutorial and adjudicative functions, he certainly has the 
authority to delegate to others the direct responsibility for 
investigative, prosecutorial and adjudicative decisions in an 
individual case. Indeed, such a delegation will necessarily occur 
as a result of the director's recusal of himself from the 
proceedings against Davis. Thus, Davis has failed to frame any 
substantial due process question concerning the combination of 
powers exercised by the director in the Division proceedings 
against Davis. 
Davis's third due process claim is likewise meritless. 
Davis complains that he was given no notice that the Division 
considered him in violation of his probation before that charge was 
formally initiated before the Board. Davis does not dispute, 
however, that he has been given notice of the formal adjudicatory 
proceedings before the Board and that he will be given the 
opportunity to dispute that charge before the Board determines that 
issue. Davis cites no authority for the proposition that he was 
entitled to notice that the Division found a basis on which to 
charge him with probation violations before those charges were 
brought. Again, Davis has failed to pose any substantial due 
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process question. See, e.g. , Metropolitan Dade County v. Dep't of 
Commerce, 365 So. 2d 432, 435 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1978) (to avoid 
exhaustion requirement, plaintiff must do more than "hint" at 
constitutional issue). 
While Davis will not suffer any substantial harm from 
being required to exhaust his administrative remedies, the public 
interest in going forward with the proceedings against Davis is 
strong. To the extent the Division proceedings are subject to 
collateral attack, the Division is hampered from effectively 
fulfilling its vital role of enforcing standards of professional 
conduct. '" [E]xhaustion principles apply with special force when 
'frequent and deliberate flouting of administrative processes' 
could weaken an agency's effectiveness by encouraging disregard of 
its procedures." McCarthy v. Madiqan, U.S. , 112 S. Ct. 
1081, 1086 (1992). Davis's own persistent attempts to derail the 
Division proceedings against him demonstrate this principle. 
Moreover, the charges involved in this particular proceeding are 
serious in nature and the public interest requires that they be 
resolved in as expeditious a manner as possible consistent with 
fairness. On balance, the public interest is far better served by 
requiring Davis to raise his constitutional challenges by direct 
appellate review of the proceedings. 
CONCLUSION 
The Utah Administrative Procedures Act provides the 
exclusive means for judicial review of formal adjudicative 
proceedings of state agencies by direct appeal to an appellate 
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court. Even if the district court had discretion to review Davis's 
claim, however, it properly exercised that discretion to require 
Davis to exhaust his administrative remedies. The statutory scheme 
for judicial review of agency orders provides an adequate means of 
reviewing Davis's constitutional claims. Davis will not suffer any 
substantial irreparable harm from being required to raise those 
claims on direct appeal from an agency order and the public 
interest in going forward with the disciplinary proceedings far 
outweighs any harm caused to Davis by requiring exhaustion. 
The judgment of the district court should be affirmed. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this J-£^day of February, 1993. 
JAN GRAHAM 
Attorney General 
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Assistant Attorney General 
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ADDENDUM A 
63-46b-l. Scope and applicability of chapter [Effective 
until April 1, 1992]. 
(1) Except as set forth in Subsection (2), and except as otherwise provided 
by a statute superseding provisions of this chapter by explicit reference to this 
chapter, the provisions of this chapter apply to every agency of the state of 
Utah and govern: 
(a) all state agency actions that determine the legal rights, duties, 
privileges, immunities, or other legal interests of one or more identifiable 
persons, including all agency actions to grant, deny, revoke, suspend, 
modify, annul, withdraw, or amend an authority, right, or license; and 
(b) judicial review of all such actions. 
(2) The provisions of this chapter do not govern: 
(a) the procedures for promulgation of agency rules, or the judicial 
review of those procedures or rules; 
(b) the issuance of any notice of a deficiency in the payment of a tax, 
the decision to waive penalties or interest on taxes, the imposition of, and 
penalties or interest on, taxes, or the issuance of any tax assessment, 
except that the provisions of this chapter govern any agency action com-
menced by a taxpayer or by another person authorized by law to contest 
the validity or correctness of those actions; 
(c) state agency actions relating to extradition, to the granting of par-
dons or parole, commutations or terminations of sentences, or to the re-
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scission, termination, or revocation of parole or probation, to actions and 
decisions of the Psychiatric Security Review Board relating to discharge, 
conditional release, or retention of persons under its jurisdiction, to the 
discipline of, resolution of grievances of, supervision of, confinement of, or 
the treatment of, inmates or residents of any correctional facility, the 
Utah State Hospital, the Utah State Developmental Center, or persons in 
the custody or jurisdiction of the Division of Mental Health, or persons on 
probation or parole, or judicial review of those actions; 
(d) state agency actions to evaluate, discipline, employ, transfer, reas-
sign, or promote students or teachers in any school or educational institu-
tion, or judicial review of those actions; 
(e) applications for employment and internal personnel actions within 
an agency concerning its own employees, or judicial review of those ac-
tions; 
(f) the issuance of any citation or assessment under Chapter 9, Title 35, 
Occupational Safety and Health Act, except that the provisions of this 
chapter govern any agency action commenced by the employer or other 
person authorized by law to contest the validity or correctness of such a 
citation or assessment; 
(g) state agency actions relating to management of state funds, and 
contracts for the purchase or sale of products, real property, supplies, 
goods, or services by or for the state, or by or for an agency of the state, 
except as provided in such contracts, or judicial review of those actions; 
(h) state agency actions under Article 3, Chapter 1, Title 7, Powers and 
Duties of Commissioner of Financial Institutions, and Chapters 2,8a, and 
19, Title 7, and Chapter 30, Title 63, Utah Governmental Immunity Act, 
or judicial review of those actions; 
(i) the initial determination of any person's eligibility for unemploy-
ment benefits, the initial determination of any person's eligibility for 
benefits under Chapters 1 and 2, Title 35, or the initial determination of a 
person's unemployment tax liability; 
(j) state agency actions relating to the distribution or award of mone-
tary grants to or between governmental units, or for research, develop-
ment, or the arts, or judicial review of those actions; 
(k) the issuance of any notice of violation or order under Chapter 8,11, 
12, 13, or 14, Title 26, except that the provisions of this chapter govern 
any agency action commenced by any person authorized by law to contest 
the validity or correctness of any such notice or order; 
(1) state agency actions, to the extent required by federal statute or 
regulation to be conducted according to federal procedures; 
(m) the initial determination of any person's eligibility for government 
or public assistance benefits, or the right of any person to obtain docu-
ments or information from an agency; 
(n) state agency actions relating to wildlife licenses, permits, tags, and 
certificates of registration; and 
(o) licenses for use of state recreational facilities. 
(3) The provisions of this chapter do not affect any legal remedies otherwise 
available to: 
(a) compel an agency to take action; or 
(b) challenge an agency's rule. 
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(4) This chapter does not preclude an agency, prior to the beginning of an 
adjudicative proceeding, or the presiding officer during an adjudicative pro-
ceeding from: 
(a) requesting or ordering conferences with parties and interested per-
sons to: 
(i) encourage settlement; 
(ii) clarify the issues; 
(iii) simplify the evidence; 
(iv) facilitate discovery; or 
(v) expedite the proceedings; or 
(b) granting a timely motion to dismiss or for summary judgment if the 
requirements of Rule 12(b) or Rule 56, respectively, of the Utah Rules of 
Civil Procedure are met by the moving party, except to the extent that 
the requirements of those rules are modified by this chapter. 
(5) (a) Declaratory proceedings authorized by Section 63-46b-21 are not 
governed by this chapter, except as explicitly provided in that section. 
(b) Judicial review of declaratory proceedings authorized by Section 
63-46b-21 are governed by this chapter. 
(6) This chapter does not preclude an agency from enacting rules affecting 
or governing adjudicative proceedings or from following any of those rules, if 
the rules are enacted according to the procedures outlined in Chapter 46a, 
Title 63, Utah Administrative Rulemaking Act, and if the rules conform to 
the requirements of this chapter. 
(7) If the attorney general issues a written determination that any provi-
sion of this chapter would result in the denial of funds or services to an agency 
of the state from the federal government, the applicability of those provisions 
to that agency shall be suspended to the extent necessary to prevent the 
denial. The attorney general shall report the suspension to the Legislature at 
its next session. 
(8) Nothing in this chapter may be interpreted to provide an independent 
basis for jurisdiction to review final agency action. 
(9) Nothing in this chapter may be interpreted to restrict a presiding offi-
cer, for good cause shown, from lengthening or shortening any time period 
prescribed in this chapter, except those time periods established for judicial 
review. 
63-46b-14. Judicial review — Exhaustion of administra-
tive remedies. 
(1) A party aggrieved may obtain judicial review of final agency action, 
except in actions where judicial review is expressly prohibited by statute. 
(2) A party may seek judicial review only after exhausting all administra-
tive remedies available, except that: 
(a) a party seeking judicial review need not exhaust administrative 
remedies if this chapter or any other statute states that exhaustion is not 
required; 
(b) the court may relieve a party seeking judicial review of the require-
ment to exhaust any or all administrative remedies if: 
(i) the administrative remedies are inadequate; or 
(ii) exhaustion of remedies would result in irreparable harm dis-
proportionate to the public benefit derived from requiring exhaus-
tion. 
(3) (a) A party shall file a petition for judicial review of final agency action 
within 30 days after the date that the order constituting the final agency 
action is issued or is considered to have been issued under Subsection 
63-46b-13(3)(b). 
(b) The petition shall name the agency and all other appropriate par-
ties as respondents and shall meet the form requirements specified in this 
chapter. 
History: C. 1953,63-46b-14, enacted by L. to have been issued under Subsection 
1987, ch. 161, § 270; 1988, ch. 72, § 24. 63-46b-13(3)(b)" in Subsection (3); and made 
Amendment Notes. — The 1988 amend- minor stylistic changes, 
ment, effective April 25, 1988, divided former Effective Dates. — Laws 1987, ch. 161, 
Subsection (1) into present Subsections (1) and § 315
 m a kes the act effective on January 1, 
(2) and redesignated former Subsection (2) as ^933 
present Subsection (3); added "or is considered 
63-46b-16. Judicial review — Formal adjudicative pro-
ceedings. 
(1) As provided by statute, the Supreme Court or the Court of Appeals has 
jurisdiction to review all final agency action resulting from formal adjudica-
tive proceedings. 
(2) (a) To seek judicial review of final agency action resulting from formal 
adjudicative proceedings, the petitioner shall file a petition for review of 
agency action with the appropriate appellate court in the form required 
by the appellate rules of the appropriate appellate court. 
(b) The appellate rules of the appropriate appellate court shall govern 
all additional filings and proceedings in the appellate court. 
(3) The contents, transmittal, and filing of the agency's record for judicial 
review of formal adjudicative proceedings are governed by the Utah Rules of 
Appellate Procedure, except that: 
(a) all parties to the review proceedings may stipulate to shorten, sum-
marize, or organize the record; 
(b) the appellate court may tax the cost of preparing transcripts and 
copies for the record: 
(i) against a party who unreasonably refuses to stipulate to 
shorten, summarize, or organize the record; or 
(ii) according to any other provision of law. 
(4) The appellate court shall grant relief only if, on the basis of the agency's 
record, it determines that a person seeking judicial review has been substan-
tially prejudiced by any of the following: 
(a) the agency action, or the statute or rule on which the agency action 
is based, is unconstitutional on its face or as applied; 
(b) the agency has acted beyond the jurisdiction conferred by any stat-
ute; 
(c) the agency has not decided all of the issues requiring resolution; 
(d) the agency has erroneously interpreted or applied the law; 
(e) the agency has engaged in an unlawful procedure or decision-mak-
ing process, or has failed to follow prescribed procedure; 
(f) the persons taking the agency action were illegally constituted as a 
decision-making body or were subject to disqualification; 
(g) the agency action is based upon a determination of fact, made or 
implied by the agency, that is not supported by substantial evidence when 
viewed in light of the whole record before the court; 
(h) the agency action is: 
(i) an abuse of the discretion delegated to the agency by statute; 
(ii) contrary to a rule of the agency; 
(iii) contrary to the agency's prior practice, unless the agency justi-
fies the inconsistency by giving facts and reasons that demonstrate a 
fair and rational basis for the inconsistency; or 
(iv) otherwise arbitrary or capricious. 
History: C. 1953, 63-46b-16, enacted by L. 
1987, ch. 161, § 272; 1988, ch. 72, & 26. 
Amendment Notes. — The 1988 amend-
ment, effective April 25, 1988, substituted "As 
provided by statute, the Supreme Court or the 
Court of Appeals" for "The Supreme Court or 
other appellate court designated by statute" in 
Subsection (1); inserted vwith the appropriate 
appellate court" in Subsection (2)(a); and sub-
stituted "appellate rules of the appropriate ap-
pellate court" for "Utah Rules of Appellate Pro-
cedure" in Subsections (2)(a) and (2Kb). 
Effective Dates. — Laws 1987, ch. 161, 
§315 makes the act effective on January 1, 
1988. 
63-46b-18. Judicial review — Stay and other temporary 
remedies pending final disposition. 
(1) Unless precluded by another statute, the agency may grant a stay of its 
order or other temporary remedy during the pendency of judicial review, ac-
cording to the agency's rules. 
(2) Parties shall petition the agency for a stay or other temporary remedies 
unless extraordinary circumstances require immediate judicial intervention. 
(3) If the agency denies a stay or denies other temporary remedies re-
quested by a party, the agency's order of denial shall be mailed to all parties 
and shall specify the reasons why the stay or other temporary remedy was not 
granted. 
(4) If the agency has denied a stay or other temporary remedy to protect the 
public health, safety, or welfare against a substantial threat, the court may 
not grant a stay or other temporary remedy unless it finds that: 
(a) the agency violated its own rules in denying the stay; or 
(b) (i) the party seeking judicial review is likely to prevail on the 
merits when the court finally disposes of the matter; 
(ii) the party seeking judicial review will suffer irreparable injury 
without immediate relief; 
(iii) granting relief to the party seeking review will not substan-
tially harm other parties to the proceedings; and 
(iv) the threat to the public health, safety, or welfare relied upon 
by the agency is not sufficiently serious to justify the agency's action 
under the circumstances. 
History: C. 1953,63-46b-18, enacted by L. § 315 makes the act effective on January 1, 
1987, ch. 161, § 274. 1988. 
Effective Dates. — Laws 1987, ch. 161, 
ADDENDUM B 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR 
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
ROBERT C. DAVID, : MEMORANDUM DECISION 
Plaintiff, : CASE NO. 910907449 CV 
vs. : JUDGE FRANK G. NOEL 
DAVID E. ROBINSON, et al., : 
Defendant. : 
This matter is now before the Court is defendants' Motion 
to Dismiss. The Court has reviewed the memos submitted in 
connection with said Motion, has heard oral argument, has taken 
the matter under advisement and now rules as follows: 
A substantial portion of this Complaint for Declaratory 
and Injunctive Relief has been rendered moot by defendant David 
E. Robinson's recusal of himself from participating in any 
further proceedings in this matter involving the plaintiff. 
What remains is estentially a constitutional attack on the 
statutes under which the Division of Occupational and 
Professional Licensing and the Utah Medical Licensing Board is 
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proceeding against plaintiff. The narrow issue before the Court 
is whether the plaintiff can, during the pendency of the 
administrative proceeding, bring an action for declaratory and 
injunctive relief against the agency involved claiming the 
statute under which they are proceeding is unconstitutional. 
Defendants claim that this issue can be decided by the Court of 
Appeals in the proper manner after the hearing, and that 
plaintiff has failed to exhaust his administrative remedies. 
Plaintiff relies primarily on Ward v. Village of 
Monroeville, 409 U.S. 57 (1972) and Utah Restaurant Association 
v. Davis County Board of Health, 709 P2d 1159 (Utah, 1985). It 
should be noted, however, that neither of those cases deal 
specifically with the issue of exhaustion of administrative 
remedies. 
Both parties cite Johnson v. Utah State Retirement 
Office, 621 P2d 1234 (Utah, 1980) . That case however did rule 
that plaintiff had failed to exhaust administrative remedies and 
dismissed the matter referring it back to the administrative 
agency for further hearing. The Court said in that case: 
"Plaintiff's assertion of a constitutional issue does 
not alter the necessity for compliance with the 
requirement of first adjudicating their claim before 
the Retirement Board....As stated in Pulic Utilities... 
11
 If...an administrative proceeding might leave no 
remnant of the constitutional question the administrative 
remedy plainly should be pursued."11 
DAVID V. ROBINSON PAGE 3 MEMO DECISION 
The Court is of the opinion that plaintiff should pursue 
his remedies in the administrative proceeding and if it becomes 
necessary to address the constitutional issue then it can be 
done so in the appropriate manner. 
Accordingly defendants' Motion to Dismiss is granted. 
Counsel for defendants is to prepare an order consistent 
with this ruling and submit it for signature in accordance the 
the local rules of practice. 
DATED this 
:1 day of March, 1992. 
2^ 
FRANK G. NO 
DISTRICT COWRT^ 
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MAILING CERTIFICATE 
I hereby certify that I mailed a true and correct copy of 
the foregoing Memorandum Decision, postage prepaid, to the 
following, this 1 day of March, 1992: 
Peter Stirba 
Elizabeth J. Buchanan 
STIRBA & HATHAWAY 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
215 South State Street, Suite 1150 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Dan R. Larsen 
Assistant Attorney General 
Attorney for Defendants 
23 6 State Capitol 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84114 
R. PAUL VAN DAM - 3312 
Attorney General 
DAN R. LARSEN - 4865 
Assistant Attorney General 
Attorneys for Defendants 
236 State Capitol 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84114 
Telephone: (801) 53 8-1016 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
ROBERT C. DAVIS, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
DAVID E. ROBINSON, in his 
individual capacity as 
Director of the Division 
of Occupational & 
Professional Licensing of 
the Department of Business 
Regulation, and the 
DIVISION OF OCCUPATIONAL & 
PROFESSIONAL LICENSING at 
the Department of Business 
Regulation, State of Utah, 
and the UTAH MEDICAL 
LICENSING BOARD, and R. 
PAUL VAN DAM, in his 
capacity as Attorney 
General for the State of 
Utah, 
Defendants. 
ORDER ON DEFENDANTS' MOTION 
TO DISMISS 
Civil No. 910907449CV 
Judge Frank G. Noel 
Defendants' Motion to Dismiss came on for hearing 
before the Court on February 28, 1992, at 9:00 a.m. Plaintiff 
was represented by Peter Stirba; defendants were represented by 
Dan R. Larsen, Assistant Attorney General. Having heard and 
considered the arguments of counsel, together with the 
memorandums of law, and having filed a Memorandum Decision on 
March 4, 1992, it is hereby ORDERED, ADJUDGED and DECREED as 
follows: 
1. Defendants' Motion to Dismiss is granted for the 
reasons stated in the Memorandum Decision. 
2. Plaintiff's Complaint is dismissed with prejudice. 
DATED this -^ Oday of N,( >
 v, £ { y 1992. 
BY THE COURT: ^sss=^r>>. 
FRANK G. NOEEi -V ' 
District Court"Judge ^ 
MAILING CERTIFICATE 
I hereby certify that I mailed a true and correct copy 
of the foregoing Order on Defendants' Motion to Dismiss, postage 
prepaid, this /.—- day of March, 1992, to the following: 
Peter Stirba 
Elizabeth J. Buchanan 
Stirba & Hathaway 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
215 South State Street, Suite 1150 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
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